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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-1707 & 06-2825
________________
CRANBURY BROOK FARMS;
J. CLARK POLING,
  Appellants
v.
THE TOWNSHIP OF CRANBURY
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02105)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2006
BEFORE: RENDELL, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 7, 2007)
________________
OPINION
________________
PER CURIAM
Appellants, Cranbury Brook Farms (a sole proprietorship), and J. Clark Poling,
appeal the District Court’s dismissal of their complaint, denial of their motion to amend
     The latter two actions were voluntarily dismissed by Poling.1
2
their complaint, and award of attorney’s fees to Appellee as a sanction pursuant to Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Poling has been a party to numerous state and federal court proceedings related to
the distribution of property owned by his grandparents prior to their passing.  In this
connection, it appears that both the Chamberlin Farm in East Windsor, New Jersey, and
the Tantum and Major Farms, in Cranbury Township, New Jersey, have been partitioned
and sold in state court proceedings.  See Cranbury Brook Farms v. Township of
Cranbury, Civ. No. 00-5066, District Court Order, at 6-10 (D.N.J. July 10, 2001)
(describing relevant state court proceedings).  Since that time, Poling has initiated several
federal actions against various individuals and entities disputing the manner in which the
state court proceedings were conducted.  See, e.g., Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enters., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 502 (D.N.J. 2000), appeal dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 32 Fed.
Appx. 32 (3d Cir. 2002); Cranbury Brook Farms v. Twp. of Cranbury, Civ. No. 00-05066
(D.N.J. July 10, 2001) (Letter Opinion), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 64 Fed. Appx. 850 (3d
Cir. 2003); Poling v. Pepper Hamilton, No. 04-14363 (S.D. Fla. 2005).   This action1
continues in the same vein.
In the original complaint, Poling claims that Appellee Cranbury Township, and
“Co-conspirators” Mark Solomon and William Moran, neither of whom were  named as
defendants, acted together in a civil conspiracy to deprive him of his Fifth and Fourteenth
3Amendment rights to due process and equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985.  The crux of this claim seems to be that Poling had retained Solomon, an
attorney in private practice, to represent him in connection with the sale of the Tantum
and Major Farms.  According to Poling, Solomon was then appointed Partition
Commissioner in connection with proceedings to partition and sell these properties, which
created a conflict of interest which Solomon used to his advantage in effecting the
partition.  Poling further alleges that Moran, the former Township Attorney, participated
in this conspiracy by concealing the condition of the title to the property, thereby
depriving the taxpayers of Cranbury of clean title.  He further maintains that the property
was taken from him without just compensation or due process.  He requests a declaratory
judgment voiding the sale of the property, rescission of the agreement of sale, punitive
damages, and temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief against the
Township, barring it from continuing its wrongful acts. 
In lieu of an answer, the Township filed a motion to dismiss on July 13, 2005,
followed by a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on August 19, 2005.  On September 19, 2005, without responding to either of
the motions filed by the Township, Appellants sought leave to file a lengthy amended
complaint recounting a host of additional facts attacking the way in which the state court
partition proceeding was conducted, but articulating no new causes of action.  On
February 8, 2006, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, granted in
part Appellee’s motion for sanctions, and denied Appellants’ motion to amend. 
4We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review
the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d
229, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review its award of Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of
discretion.  See Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 1994).
The District Court dismissed the complaint based on res judicata, holding that the
dismissal of Poling’s complaint with prejudice in Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises, 99
F. Supp. 2d 502 (D.N.J. 2000), constituted a final judgment on the merits precluding him
from raising the same claims in the present action.  Because it appears that the subject of
that action was actually the Chamberlin Farm, not the Tantum and Major Farms, and that
the action did not involve Cranbury Township, we do not agree that res judicata applies. 
See In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a judgment
on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action).  We may, however, affirm the dismissal of a
complaint on any basis found in the record.  See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d
Cir. 2000).  Upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellants have
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Accordingly, we will affirm the
District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ complaint.  We will also affirm its entry of Rule
11 sanctions in favor of Appellee.
In both his original and amended complaints, Poling claims that his due process
and equal protection rights were violated and that he is entitled to redress for these
wrongs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Section 1983 bars “the deprivation of any rights,
     While Appellants allege that Solomon and Moran acted as “co-conspirators,” they2
have not been named as defendants in this action, and therefore we do not address the
merits of any claims Appellants might have brought against them.
     To the extent Appellants challenge the way in which the partition proceedings3
were conducted in state court, their claims cannot be raised in a subsequent federal action
such as this.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “state-court losers [from]
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments”).
     To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2)4
motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act
5
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by any person acting
under color of state law.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 
In neither of the complaints does Poling articulate any way in which the Township of
Cranbury deprived him of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.   See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).  While it is clear that Poling is2
dissatisfied with the process by which the properties in question were partitioned and
sold, he has not identified any way in which his constitutional rights were violated by that
sale.3
Poling additionally complains of a civil conspiracy resulting in the violation of his
due process and equal protection rights.  To the extent Poling raises these claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, he has failed to allege any “racial or class based discriminatory
animus” by which such a conspiracy was motivated, nor does the record reflect any basis
for one.   As such, these claims must fail.  See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.4
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation
of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.  See Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
6
1997).
Appellants also challenge the District Court’s denial of their motion for leave to
file an amended complaint.  Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course before a responsive
pleading is served.  Because a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss is not considered a
responsive pleading, Appellants were entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter
of course without leave of the District Court.  See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d
Cir. 2000).  However, we need not address whether the District Court erred in denying
Appellants’ motion for leave to amend because, as we have already explained, the
amended complaint fails to state a claim as well.
Finally, Appellants argue that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding
Appellee Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees without considering whether
Appellants could afford to pay the fees.  We have held that district courts may “award[]
attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants in an effort to discourage plaintiffs from bringing
baseless actions or making frivolous motions.”  Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).
In awarding Appellee attorney’s fees, the District Court observed that Poling had
raised similar claims in New Jersey, Florida and Pennsylvania courts, all of which had
7been dismissed, either by the courts or voluntarily.  Furthermore, he had previously been
warned against filing frivolous and repetitive lawsuits prior to the imposition of sanctions. 
The District Court further noted that we had previously upheld the imposition of
sanctions against Poling, and that none of the above factors had succeeded in deterring
him from filing frivolous lawsuits against the parties involved in the partition and sale of
the Chamberlin, Tantum and Major Farms. 
Poling now contends, as he did in connection with his appeal of the District
Court’s grant of Rule 11 sanctions in Cranbury Brook Farms v. Township of Cranbury,
64 Fed. Appx. 850 (3d Cir. 2003), that the District Court failed to consider his indigency
in granting Appellee’s motion.  We have previously directed the district courts to consider
a litigant’s ability to pay in granting an award of attorney’s fees.  Doering, 857 F.3d at
195-96.  However, as with the last motion, Poling failed to apprise the District Court of
his inability to pay.  In fact, the record reflects no response at all from Poling to the
Township’s motion for sanctions.  On September 9, 2005, the District Court granted
Appellants an extension of time in which to respond to Appellee’s motion, yet Appellants
failed to file a response at any point during the interceding five months.  As we held in
connection with the prior appeal:
The Appellants failed to raise these issues in the District Court despite the
opportunity to do so.  It is not the usual practice of this Court to consider
and determine issues argued on appeal that were not presented or
considered in the first instance in the District Court.  But, even if we were
to address these arguments, the Appellants failed to produce any evidence
of their inability to pay in the District Court.  See White v. General Motors
Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that inability to pay
8should be treated as akin to an affirmative defense, with the burden on the
sanctioned parties to come forward with evidence of their financial status). 
Because the District Court had no evidence of the Appellants’ inability to
pay, it had no basis for decreasing the monetary sanction on that ground.
Given Appellants’ failure to respond to Appellee’s motion, the District Court in this
action similarly had no basis for mitigation.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the
District Court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee attorney’s fees and costs in the
amount of $22,000.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.
